Considering the risk of SMEs, financial
institutions have been cautious about the financing of SMEs. Supply chain
finance, through the integration of information chain, capital chain, logistics
chain, and so on, forms an internal circulation ecosystem, which is a
breakthrough to solve the financing difficulties of SEMs. In the development of
supply chain finance in China, the evaluation of the enterprise’s credit,
collateral is basically carried out by the bank or the bank commissioned by
third parties. Therefore, the main mode of supply chain finance in China is
banking-oriented model. At the same time, as the most powerful leading
enterprise in the supply chain, the core enterprise can help to improve the
whole supply chain with the advantage of information and credit. The credit
guarantee financing model, providing credit guarantee for the downstream
retailers, gradually appeared.
In the supply chain, only a small number of
scholars consider the impact of financial constraints on the supply chain
decisions. The research about the decision-making of three echelon supply
chain, retailer-manufacturer-bank, is also less. In this paper, the credit
guarantee contract is integrated into the supply chain finance model, to study
the decision-making of supply chain finance.
This paper studies the decision-making
problem of three echelon supply chain, retailer-manufacturer-bank, in
centralized and decentralized systems. Through the calculation, it is proved
that under the credit guarantee of the core enterprise, the retailer has the
optimal ordering strategy, and the core enterprise has the optimal wholesale
price. Besides, the optimal profit of the SCF system in centralized system is
always higher than the sum of the three SCF participants’ optimal profit in the
decentralized system. The retailer’s loan coefficient and the credit guarantee
coefficient can narrow the optimal profit gap between the decentralized and
centralized system to a certain extent. It is embodied in two aspects. On the
one hand, when the retailer’s loan coefficient is consistent with the wholesale
price, that the retailer’s loan amount is 0, the optimal profit of the SCF
system in centralized system is the same as the sum of the three SCF
participants’ optimal profit in the decentralized system. Considering that the
principal and interest of the retailer are the retailer’s total sales when the
supply chain financial system is balanced, i.e. the retailer’s profit is zero.
Hence, the retailer’s loan coefficient can narrow the optimal profit gap
between the decentralized and centralized system to a certain extent. On the
other hand, the smaller λ is, the narrower optimal profit gap between the
decentralized and centralized system is. Considering that the bank’s expect profit
is negative when the credit guarantee coefficient is too small, the credit
guarantee coefficient can narrow the optimal profit gap between the
decentralized and centralized system to a certain extent. There are also
shortcomings in this paper. In this paper, the decisions of parameter a and λ
are not taken into account in the game model, but the influences on the game
result are analyzed. On the other hand, this paper considers a simpler supply
chain model. The actual situation is that supply chain finance financing is
facing a more complex supply chain system, and involves dynamic evolution.
Article by Yueliang Su and Baoyu Zhong,from
South China University of Technology, Guangzhou, China
Full access: http://mrw.so/LnGxX
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