Read full paper at: http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=50303#.VDXaWVfHRK0 Author(s) Rimvydas Baltaduonis 1 , Lucas Rentschler 2 Affiliation(s) 1 Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, USA . 2 Universidad Fransisco Marroquín, Guatemala City, Guatemala . ABSTRACT This note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and renegotiat...
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