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This
note contains the equilibrium bid functions for two types of common-value
procurement auctions: 1) a procurement auction in which bids represent an
enforceable contract; 2) a procurement auction in which, upon learning the true
cost of supplying the good, the winning bidder can renegotiate the contract
with the buyer, and each bidder must submit a bond with their bid, which is
returned at the end of the auction unless they are the low bidder and
renegotiate the contract.
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Cite this paper
Baltaduonis, R. and Rentschler, L. (2014) Common-Value Procurement Auctions with Renegotiation. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 619-622. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.48078.
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