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ABSTRACT
This
paper adopts the accident incidence, the gross industry output value,
the investment in safety facilities, and per capita wage of employment
as the indexes to empirically analyze the investment performance of
chemical safety facilities using time series data by VECM in China. The
empirical results indicate that for China’s chemical industry,
increasing investment fails to improve the short-term safety level
significantly because of the offsetting behavior of workers. Over the
long term, the offsetting behavior tends to disappear, and the chemical
accident incidence can be decreased through increasing investment. Poor
safety awareness among workers is one of the causes of accident
incidences. The conclusions provide theoretical support for China to
perfect chemical industry safety management.
Cite this paper
References
Sun, K. , Bai, L. and Li, X. (2015) Analysis of the Chemical Safety Facility Investment Performance in China. Advances in Chemical Engineering and Science, 5, 102-109. doi: 10.4236/aces.2015.51011.
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