Read full paper at:
http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=47408#.VMib9izQrzE
http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=47408#.VMib9izQrzE
ABSTRACT
I
utilize a differentiable dynamical system á la Lotka-Voletrra and
explain monetary and fiscal interaction in a supranational monetary
union. The paper demonstrates an applied mathematical approach that
provides useful insights about the interaction mechanisms in theoretical
economics in general and a monetary union in particular. I find that a
common central bank is necessary but not sufficient to tackle the new
interaction problems in a supranational monetary union, such as the
free-riding behaviour of fiscal policies. Moreover, I show that
supranational institutions, rules or laws are essential to mitigate
violations of decentralized fiscal policies.
Cite this paper
References
Herzog, B. (2014) Applied Mathematical Theory for Monetary-Fiscal Interaction in a Supranational Monetary Union. Journal of Applied Mathematics and Physics, 2, 737-744. doi: 10.4236/jamp.2014.28081.
| [1] | Libich,
J. and Stehlik, P. (2012) Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline
under Generalized Timing of Actions. Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics, 168, 393-431. http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245612802920962 |
| [2] | Dixit,
A. and Lambertini, L. (2003) Interactions of Commitment and Discretion
in Monetary and Fiscal Policies. The American Economic Review, 93,
1522-1542. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/000282803322655428 |
| [3] | Beetsma,
R. and Jensen, H. (2003) Contingent Deficit Sanctions and Moral Hazard
with a Stability Pact. Journal of International Economics, 61, 187-208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00083-1 |
| [4] | Beetsma, R. and Bovenberg, L. (1999) Does Monetary Unification Lead to Excessive Debt Accumulation? Journal of Political Economics, 74, 299-325. |
| [5] | Beetsma, R. and Uhlig, H. (1999) An Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Economic Journal, 109, 546-571. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00462 |
| [6] | Beetsma, R. and Bovenberg, L. (2001) The Optimality of a Monetary Union without Fiscal Union. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 33, 179-204. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2673880 |
| [7] | Beetsma, R. and Bovenberg, L. (2002) Strategic Debt Accumulation in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union. Journal of Political Economics, 19, 1-15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(02)00126-X |
| [8] | Gali, J. and Monacelli, T. (2008) Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy in a Currency Union. Journal of International Economics, 76, 116-132. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2008.02.007 |
| [9] | Kirsanova,
T. and Wren-Lewis, S. (2012) Optimal Fiscal Feedback on Debt in an
Economy with Nominal Rigidities. Economic Journal, 122, 238-264. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02458.x |
| [10] | Hallet, A.H. and Svend, H.J. (2012) Fiscal Governance in the Euro Area. Journal of European Public Policy, 19, 646-664. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2011.646773 |
| [11] | Herzog, B. and Hengstermann, K. (2013) Restoring Credible Economic Governance to the Eurozone. Economic Affairs, 33, 2-17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12009 |
| [12] | Torbati, A.S. and Chakoli, A.N. (2013) Empirical Examination of Lotka’s Law for Applied Mathematics. Life Science Journal, 10, 601-607. eww150128lx |
评论
发表评论