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Distorted Factor Markets, Government Intervention, and Excess Capital Accumulation: The Case of China

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This paper develops a simple growth model that embeds distorted factor markets and government intervention that achieves high economic growth, low consumption, and high investment simultaneously. All of these phenomena are consistent with Chinese macroeconomic data since the 1990s, implying the inefficiency of economic growth.
Cite this paper
Gu, T. (2014) Distorted Factor Markets, Government Intervention, and Excess Capital Accumulation: The Case of China. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 806-814. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.49102.
 

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http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1365100507070034                  eww141208lx
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