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http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=50869#.VE8BkVfHRK0
Author(s)
1Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Universidad de Alicante, Alicante, Spain.
2Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoI, Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU), Bilbao, Spain.
3IKERBASQUE—Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain.
4Departamento de Economía y Estadística, Universidad de León, León, Spain.
5Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli, Roma, Italy.
2Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis EconómicoI, Universidad del País Vasco (UPV/EHU), Bilbao, Spain.
3IKERBASQUE—Basque Foundation for Science, Bilbao, Spain.
4Departamento de Economía y Estadística, Universidad de León, León, Spain.
5Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli, Roma, Italy.
We report a laboratory experiment on
strategic manipulation in positional rules, by which individuals are
asked to elicit a complete ranking over 3 alternatives. The prominent
rule in this set is the so-called Borda Count, but our experiment also
considers other rules in which
we increase the score associated to the second-best candidate and vary
the monetary prizes in case of a victory of the latter (“preference
intensity”). Our results suggest that, as standard game-theoretic logic
would suggest, when the intermediate scores and prizes increase,
strategic manipulation is reduced. We also see that group size affects
the likelihood of strategic manipulation in a non-linear fashion, and
mostly depends on how the intermediate score is manipulated.
Furthermore, rule efficiency increases with group size (i.e., as the
probability of being pivotal decreases) and with both the intermediate
scores and prizes.
Cite this paper
Mata-Pérez, E. , Laruelle, A. , Martínez, R. and
Ponti, G. (2014) Preference Intensity in Positional Voting. Theoretical Economics Letters, 4, 727-738. doi: 10.4236/tel.2014.48092.
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