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Actors’ Power, Livelihood Assets and Participatory Forestry in Bangladesh: Evidence from the Sal Forests Area

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Decentralize in forest management policies towards more people-oriented approaches have become major policy trends in many of the world’s developing countries during the last decade. However, the power of important actors to misuse the participatory forestry (PF) approach for their self-interests has been stated as a main problem to success. So, this study attempt to identify the most powerful actors and the extent at which they influence the outcomes of PF, and also to measure the impact of PF on livelihood assets of participants. The empirical data were collected from the well-established PF programs at Madhupur Sal forests area of Bangladesh. The results showed that the forest department (FD) proved itself as the most powerful and influential actor in every elements of power analysis in PF. Regarding to livelihood analysis, the results revealed that the overall value of participants’ livelihood assets was 0.85 and it was significantly differed from the non-participants value of 0.66. However, the development of human, physical and financial assets was not indicating a decent improvement like as natural and social assets of participants. So, it is necessary to pay more attention to boost up participants’ human and financial assets through intensive training and adopting proper tree-crop production techniques, and also ensuring alternative livelihoods approaches to the local people. In addition, the local government will need to pay more emphasis on constructing village roads and infrastructure so as to enhance physical assets of the local people. Finally, the study would recommend promoting PF with apposite government facilities and also empowering local participants in order to balance the power among different actors, and this will facilitate the participants in governing all of their development activities efficiently.
Cite this paper
Islam, K. , Kimihiko, H. , Tani, M. , Krott, M. and Sato, N. (2014) Actors’ Power, Livelihood Assets and Participatory Forestry in Bangladesh: Evidence from the Sal Forests Area. Open Journal of Forestry, 4, 1-9. doi: 10.4236/ojf.2014.45B001.
 

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